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LAFD report calls for major changes after devastating Palisades Fire

LAFD report calls for major changes after devastating Palisades Fire
The LAFD report says changes are needed to combat future wildfires.
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The Los Angeles Fire Department needs to overhaul its staffing policies, improve communication systems and enhance wildfire training following the devastating Palisades Fire that killed 12 people and destroyed much of the Pacific Palisades community, according to a city-commissioned review released Wednesday.

The 67-page after-action report identified dozens of recommendations for improvement, including ending the practice of allowing firefighters to go off duty during extreme weather conditions when fiscal concerns outweigh public safety considerations.

"Although an effort was made to maintain fiscal responsibility within the Department, there remains no substitute for preparedness and response when deploying resources effectively to wind-driven vegetation fires in the matter of public safety," the report states.

The document revealed that LAFD command staff decided not to hold over off-going personnel to fill every available seat the morning of Jan. 7, despite severe Red Flag weather conditions. The decision proved costly when hurricane-force winds quickly drove the fire through the community.

"The fire conditions and initial ferocity of fire behavior overwhelmed the immediately available resources in the Palisades area," according to the report. "A recall of all members to fill every available seat was implemented after the start of the Palisades incident."

Among the report's key recommendations, the department should immediately review its recall procedures and adopt new technologies to create a comprehensive system for bringing off-duty personnel back to work during emergencies. The current system proved inadequate, with delays hampering the department's ability to quickly allocate necessary resources.

The report also calls for the LAFD to adopt modern weather monitoring technology to better assess conditions across the city's multiple microclimates. The department's daily fire weather forecast relies on an antiquated method that calculates a single brush burning index for the entire city, which can produce inaccurate information for making deployment decisions.

Communication failures emerged as another critical issue during the initial attack. The report notes that the Metro Fire Communications center did not adhere to the communications plan and continued contacting assigned resources directly, bypassing the designated incident communications system. The center also lacks the capability to transmit or receive communications on VHF frequencies used by cooperating agencies.

"The initial communications plan for the incident did not meet the size, scope, and complexity of the incident organization that was required to effectively communicate among resources," the report states.

The document revealed that most firefighters worked for more than 36 hours without rehabilitation during the initial attack, with many not getting relief or rest for more than 48 hours. The prolonged exposure put them at risk for smoke inhalation and carbon monoxide poisoning, while physical exhaustion caused performance and safety concerns.

"The combination of fatigue, exhaustion and sleep deprivation severely hindered their ability to make safe decisions," according to the report.

Leadership challenges compounded operational difficulties. The report found that the incident command post had to be relocated multiple times as flames threatened the locations, hindering operational continuity and compromising firefighter accountability and safety. The incident organization was not clearly defined until several hours into the fire, and the operations section chief was not relieved for more than 18 hours.

"No single person can manage such a complex incident for an extended period; this hampers the ability to make safe and effective decisions," the report states.

Evacuation notifications also came too slowly. The delay in communicating evacuation orders, warnings and shelter-in-place notifications resulted in spontaneous evacuations without structured traffic control, causing citizens to block strategic routes to the fire.

Despite these challenges, the report documented numerous successes. Regional partners were proactively contacted before the fire to arrange resource assistance. Multiple civilians were rescued from hiking trails and evacuated from residences. Crews successfully retrieved salvageable belongings from homes, wrapping items in salvage covers and positioning them in safe locations.

The report praised firefighters for their resilience, noting they demonstrated "a no-fail attitude, enduring in excess of 36 hours of continuous work, exceeding typical work-rest ratio amidst severe fire conditions, relentless winds, and a perilous environment."

Aircraft responded rapidly during the initial attack, with water drops executed within 10 minutes of initial dispatch. Night air operations proved critical, with 26 aircraft available for nighttime firefighting.

The Evacuation Branch facilitated the evacuation of over 30,000 residents during the incident, including vulnerable groups such as the elderly and convalescent individuals. During the first 24 hours, there were only minor injuries reported while working in extremely hazardous conditions.

The report was released on the same day federal prosecutors announced the arrest of 29-year-old Jonathan Rinderknecht, a former Pacific Palisades resident accused of sparking the fire. Interim LAFD Chief Ronnie Villanueva told reporters the devastating fire was a re-ignition of a previous blaze from Jan. 1 that continued to smolder underground in root systems as much as 15 to 20 feet below ground.

"What we can do now is use drones to see if there are any flare ups at all, but remember when we go over with a drone, or if you're using thermal imaging cameras, it only goes down 12 inches," Villanueva said. "So if there's anything that's deep rooted, you're not going to see it, you're not going to find it, and you're definitely not going to extinguish it."

According to fire officials, after-action reports are internal documents not typically shared with the public. But given widespread interest from residents, LAFD and city officials decided to release the document publicly. The report had been previously withheld due to an ongoing federal investigation into the fire's cause.

Mayor Karen Bass emphasized the importance of learning from both successes and failures.

"It is vital we learn from what was effective, like the relentless heroism of firefighters responding to the blaze, and the challenges we faced in order to build a stronger emergency response system to prepare for whatever may come our way," Bass said in a statement.

According to the Mayor's Office, the Fire Department has taken steps since January to improve operations, including changed leadership, upgraded communications technology, enhanced wildfire training and evacuation drills.

The report provides a detailed sequence of events from the first 36 hours of the blaze, outlining 80 successes, more than 75 challenges and numerous recommendations to improve the department's response to future emergencies.

"Thousands of families are still displaced, and every day they go without a home is a day too long," Bass said. "My commitment, and the commitment of the entire city, is that we will continue to do everything we can to bring Angelenos back home."

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