STORM, from page 8 void with supplies and staffing as those agencies scrambled to respond.
I The lead relief agency in the disaster, the Red Cross was aware of crowding at the Superdome but was unable to staff that and other locally operated shelters because its workers were denied access.
I When the Red Cross placed orders for food such as Meals-Ready-to-Eat through the government, many of the requests got lost in an overburdened FEMA computer system.
CONTRACTORS: I Poor planning for emergency supplies such as food and ice contributed to waste and abuse in federal contracts.
I In one case, Mississippi officials requested from FEMA 450 trucks of water and ice, as well as 50 trucks of Meals-Ready-to-Eat in the days after the storm. “FEMA tried, but Katrina’s magnitude exposed significant weakness and inefficiencies in the process.” As a result state officials were forced to buy from the commercial market at an untold cost.
I A heavily criticized $236 million contract with Carnival Cruise Lines for temporary housing was reasonable, and similar “unfounded negative publicity” could hurt relief efforts in the future.
FEDERAL RESPONSE: I President Bush’s remarks, shortly after Katrina hit, that “I don’t think anybody anticipated the breach of the levees” showed he was not being briefed by a disaster specialist as the crisis unfolded.
I Fifty-six hours before it hit, federal officials knew Katrina had the potential to flood 75 percent of New Orleans, killing tens of thousands of residents and trapping hundreds of thousands in up to 20 feet of water. The threat also posed the high possibility that a million people would need to be evacuated from homes that would destroyed, and that the metropolitan area would be uninhabitable for several months or even years.
I Federal delays in assigning the Pentagon relief missions “may have been avoided if the President had been advised of the need for early presidential involvement.”
I Homeland Security Department chief Michael Chertoff should have activated plans “to shift the federal response posture from a reactive to proactive mode” to save lives and speed relief.
I Despite reports from FEMA and the Coast Guard the night Katrina hit, the Homeland Security Operations Center failed to conclude that New Orleans levees were breached. “Perhaps the single most important piece of information during Katrina was confirmation of the levee breaches in New Orleans.”
I FEMA sent unprecedented amounts of supplies to the region, including 11 million liters of water, 19 million pounds of ice, 6 million ready-made meals and 17 truckloads of tarps. But they initially went untouched because of confusion by state and federal officials.
I FEMA failed to prepare adequately for emergency disaster supplies and had poor accounting of what was needed and what resources it had on the ground.
I FEMA’s failure to negotiate contracts in advance led to chaos and the potential for waste and fraud due to last-minute agreements for emergency assistance.
I The agency’s contract staffing was inadequate given the size of the disaster.
COMMUNICATIONS: I Damage to communications in the region was extraordinary, but officials failed to adequately plan for alternatives. Multiple levels of government failed to prepare for the loss of power and its impact on communications, which hindered the response effort, particularly in New Orleans and along the Mississippi Gulf coast. “Despite the devastation left by Katrina, this needn’t have been the case. Catastrophic disasters may have some unpredictable consequences, but losing power and the dependent communications systems after a hurricane should not be one of them.”
I Government failed at all levels to deal with long-standing problems of “interoperability,” the ability of different public safety units to communicate with each other effectively. Although hundreds of millions of federal dollars had been spent over time, communications systems still were not always working effectively. For example, first responders in helicopters were unable to talk to crews patrolling in boats, and National Guard commanders in Louisiana and Mississippi used runners to relay orders.
MISCELLANEOUS: I Visits to emergency operation centers by politicians and celebrities, including talk-show host Oprah Winfrey and actor Sean Penn, distracted personnel from their more urgent tasks.
I Medical care was poorly planned and reactive rather than proactive.
I Shortages of supplies and delays in care abounded. I New Orleans failed to provide evacuations and help for special-needs and dialysis patients.
I New Orleans police were ill-prepared and completely overwhelmed and lost “almost all effectiveness.”
Originally published in the Santa Monica Daily Press print edition on February 16, 2006. Read the original PDF.